One question: Are you saying that our emphasis on human freedom is a red-herring or something else?

I believe for Maximus free-will was right at the center of his refutation of Pyrrhus and Monenergism. In other words, if you don’t have a real, metaphysical plurality of things to will, then you are going to end up with inevitability somewhere down the line given the supposition that God wills X. Thus, for Aquinas and Anselm following the Augustinian tradition, Augustine pretty much ties sin to mutability, and the only way to make human nature stable is to remove temporal succession and plurality from the objects of choice. Notice how Anselm says that the righteous will of Christ [in Gethsemane] came from his divinity. I think Anselm would see Christ willing self-existence as sinful and contrary to the divine will, I think the same can be said for Aquinas, which is why he cashes out the Gethsemane text just as a desire and not a true volition. Secondly, accidental relations or creatures can’t constitute intergration into virtue and result in true plurality of willing objects: 1) because the natural desire is for God and creatures or created accidents don’t deify. 2) Creatures or created realities would still be finite and evenutally you will exhaust them eventually resulting in Stasis. For Maximus, on the other hand, sin is tied to man’s potentiality for virtue (i.e. because of the gnomic will). I think Maximus would pretty much deny that prelapsarian Adam was created in what Aquinas would call habitus grace. Although, the logoi exists in Adam, he has not fixed his hypostatic employment with what is natural to him (the gnomic will again).

I think this quote from Brian Shanley O.P., highlights the real differences between Maximus and Aquinas:

“Stump argues that Aquinas is not a compatibilist because he believes the causal chain resulting in a voluntary act has to originate in principles intrinsic to the agent. She holds that “if something extrinsic to the agent were to act on the will with efficient causation, then the tie of the will to the intellect, from which acts of the will get their voluntary character, would be broken, and so the act of the will wouldn’t be voluntary” (585). This is a debatable claim, however, given what Aquinas holds about the relationship between God and the will. Stump considers the God-will problem to be restricted to theology’s consideration of grace, but it is clear from many passages in Aquinas that God is operative in the will quite apart from grace. This would imply that while Aquinas is surely not a compatibilist in the normal sense of the term, he does think that human freedom is compatible with divine causation. Aquinas does not fit neatly into either compatibilism or incompatibilism. As for the other contem-porary category, libertarianism, if it is understood to entail the principle of alternative possibilities or the freedom to do otherwise, then Aquinas does not really fit here either. As Stump shows, Aquinas does hold that liberum arbitrium entails the ability to do otherwise, but ultimately that freedom is rooted in a freedom that does not involve the will’s ability to do otherwise. We are not free with respect to alternative possibilities when its comes to the will’s natural inclination to the bonum commune or ultimate end. When confronted with God the ultimate Good, the will cannot nill; the blessed in heaven freely will God, but they cannot do otherwise. Stump argues that what really matters then for freedom is not the presence or absence of alternative possibilities, but rather that the agent’s volition causally originate internally from his own intellect and will. Stump therefore concludes that Aquinas does not fit neatly into any preexisting libertarian mold. Ultimately the will is free in Aquinas not because of its independence from intellect, but rather precisely because of its relationship to intellect.”–Analytical Thomism, The Thomist 63 (1999): 135.

I think Aquinas holds to some form of compatibilism, because of the irresistibleness of the divine essence and that alternate possibilities has to be eliminated. The problem by my lights is thus 1) AP is understood between objects of differing moral worth. 2) If AP is construed this way, than in order to maintain impeccability the object of the will must be singular and simple. This is why many philosophers today say that we have AP in this life, but not in the next. But it seems to me, anyway that free-will (if supposing AP as a necessary condition for free-will) should get better and not worse. Augustine, it would seem, would have it that Adam had libertarian free-will in the garden, but lost it never to be recovered.

Maximus on the other hand, thinks man can will otherwise in the Eschaton, it just so happens that 1) the objects of the will are infinite in number, and 2) all alternate courses of action are of equal moral worth and uncreated, and 3) you don’t have a permanent eschatological state, but a constant movement (and possibly) ever “increasing” deification.

Regarding the divine ideas, I don’t believe that Maximus and Aquinas are similar or compatible. For Maximus there is a non-identity relation not only between the logoi and the essence but between each of them, for Aquinas and Augustine they just are identical with each other and the essence (However you wish to cash out that identity, idenity is still identity).

Thanks for coming here and blogging. I hope we can have a fruitful discussion.

Daniel

I really should compose and edit offline first.

Best,
Mike

Having read Daniel’s paper straight through, I am deeply impressed with Maximus’ treatment of the issues. It would take a lot more study than I’ve done of him and of the patristic background, however, to ascertain whether his thought is fully compatible with Aquinas’ on matters touching the deposit of faith. Let’s just say I’m not convinced it isn’t.

I say so because the interlocutors in this thread seem to take for granted that Aquinas’ account of ADS is incompatible with Maximus’. I don’t think that’s right because, to the extent I can relate the two accounts given my residual ignorance of the Eastern background, they do seem mutually incompatible. If the divine “logoi” are what Maximus says they are, I see no reason to deny their coextensiveness with what Aquinas calls “divine ideas,” at least insofar as they relate to human beings. Aquins characterizes them as “ways in which the divine essence can be imitated.” Though that in itself is a thinner notion than the one Daniel has explicated, much seems to go with it even for Aquinas. I have no time to explore that question here, but it’s at least worth investigating.

One red herring that should be buried at the outset is the issue of human freedom. Obviously, prelapsarian man had what the scholastics later called “liberty of indifference,” which entails the possibility of sin; equally obviously, Christ and the blessed-in-heaven do not. But according to Anselm (“De casu diaboli” and “De libero arbitrio”) and Aquinas, Christ and the blessed have only what the scholastics later called “liberty of spontaneity,” which in itself does not entail the possibility of sin. It entails only the ability to choose among accidentally incompatible but morally acceptable alternatives. Maximus gives a more detailed and uplifting account of that than any scholastic I know.

Thus, the movement from liberty of indifference, which entails but is not entailed by liberty of spontaneity, to ONLY the latter is a process of spiritual maturation leading actually to greater freedom, not less. I see no reason to think that Anselm and Aquinas could not account for that, given their commitment to ADS.

Thanks for the reply. I think we are approaching this issue from different perspectives. I think I can give a pretty reasonable way to “separate” the philosophical framework from the Canon without being guilty of deconstructing the text.

When we talk about God from a Christian perspective, there are certain characteristics which we desire our account of God to have: God needs to be all powerful, omniscient, transcendent, three persons with one nature, etc. We desire these things apart from any philosophical framework: our theology demands it, and so we try to use philosophy to create an account that explains the data. This revelation came to me when I was listening to that Marquette professor talk about God. It became apparent from listening to him speak that God has certain characteristics made known by Revelation that we are trying to come to grips with. We were trying to fit our philosophy to match the facts.

Saying that God is one nature is not enough in Christian theology. It is possible to conceive God as one nature divided among three persons, much like we can divide a pie into three pieces: one pie, three pieces. However, this is not sufficient to explain God’s oneness. We need to posit that God is truly only one God, and that His essence cannot be divided like a pie is divided.

Thus, one of the traits deemed necessary for the Christian God to have is some sort of simplicity. It seems apparent to me (correct me if I’m wrong; I haven’t exactly done an in depth study of the Patristics in this regard) that God is one as I describe above, and not as three parts in one big pizza pie. When I read Daniel’s paper on Christ’s Synergy, I found his comments on Maximus’ concept of God’s simplicity enlightening: both the East and the West, the Orthodox and the Catholics, realize(d) that any Christian conception of God needs to have some sort of simplicity. No simplicity/indivisibility in God’s nature, no Christian God.

Here is where I think we are approaching the Canons from different angles. You seem to be reading the Canons as if the philosophy comes prior to the theology. It seems like you used a similar approach when you were critiquing Fr. Kimel’s comments on God’s incomprehensibility. You argued that because Catholic philosophers/theologians justified God’s incomprehensibility based on their view of God’s simplicity, Fr. Kimel was wrong to speak of God’s incomprehensibility apart from God’s simplicity when using a Western framework.

While I wasn’t thrilled with Fr. Kimel’s four part response, I do have to stick up for him here. You say the West should not speak of God’s incomprehensibility apart from his simplicity because His incomprehensibility is a conclusion of His simplicity. However, whereas you seem to see one as the conclusion of the other within a philosophical system, I see both divine incomprehensibility and divine simplicity as traits which must be taken into account to explain the Christian God. Therefore, it does not seem wrong to speak of God’s incomprehensibility apart from His simplicity: God has both characteristics whether or not our philosophical system can explain it or not.

Now, perhaps I misread your critique of Fr. Kimel’s response. However, I wish to use the example because I think it sheds light on the approach that I am using. The Canons say that God is simple. As I hope I explained above, I think that some version of God’s simplicity must be upheld in order to prevent some sort of tritheism, such as the three parts of one pie example. Some sort of simplicity must be asserted in God in order to show that God is truly one, united and not divided. I think this theological fact must be taken into account in any philosophical system which wishes to capture the God which is believed by Christians.

From my reading of Canon 2, it seems that Joachim was preaching just that: the Unity of the Trinity is only a collective one. Thus, according to Joachim, while God is still “one”, he is a divided God. Joachim’s vision of God would be condemned by both the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches because both seem to realize that some sort of simplicity must be maintained in order to show that there is only *one* God.

As I read both Canons, it seems that the theological fact of God’s simplicity is being asserted, not any sort of philosophical system. 600 years of Tradition or not, Canons 1 and 2 do not seem to be promoting any philosophical system, but simply stating one of those traits which God must have: simplicity. Just as Christians can call God omnipotent without having a precise definition of the term, so can simplicity be asserted without promoting a philosophical system. From my reading of the Canons, I don’t see anything which equates God’s being with His essence, etc. Of course, I could be wrong: my lack of theological and philosophical knowledge may prevent me from seeing such a direct promotion of a given system. However, I think this explanation provides an alternative interpretation of the text that works. I do not think that this explanation is ad hoc, either. I think the heresy being condemned lends itself perfectly to my explanation. I think the context of the statement makes the explanation that was given clearer. However, it is Rome, not I, that will decide if my interpretation is plausible.

I certainly do not have the requisite knowledge to begin a synthesis of any two philosophical systems, let alone Maximus and Augustine. It’s going to take more than a mere undergraduate student to find a plausible solution. However, I have a good idea what my personal reading is going to be about next year.

BTW, please pray for my grandfather. He took a turn for the worst today, and the doctors don’t think he has long to live.

I don’t think I am reading between the lines but just within the theological context of which those statments are made. Shall I attempt to read them apart from that context?

I don’t know how if canons 1 or 2 are condemning or are meant to serve to condemn pantheism or tri-theism how they could fail to discuss the being of God. How is the unity of the Trinity not discussing the being of God I wonder?

And when you speak of “substance” which notion of substance do you have in mind? As to indivisibility, I don’t have a problem there. Even if I am mistaken here and ADS is not the dogmatic position of Rome, it is still the pervasive and dominant theological teaching, in which case major theological revisions need to be made if my arguments or something like them are correct.

I grant that the context would permit a thinner intension of the term. The question is why should we think that the council had that in mind given the theological context? If it is just to get it out of a corner that the tradition has painted itself into, then that strikes me as rather ad hoc.

I don’t have a problem with giving Rome the benefit of the doubt as I would want people to read my arguments and tradition charitably as well. Even giving Rome the benefit of the doubt, how given their Augustinian framework they are going to do so? I am not trying to convince you of my position so much as to motivate your thinking on the subject. See, you thought you were done with my class, didn’t you?

Even if the word traditionally meant one thing, the context in which the word is used seems to suggest a thinner definition, at least in what was being defined.

I don’t think either argument–the traditional usage v. the usage in the statement–completely cancels the other one out (welcome to the world of philosophy, I guess). Each time I settle on one argument or the other, I get an intuitive shock, like I am leaving out something important. In the end, I think we are left right where we started: it is up to Rome to clarify the Catholic position one way or the other, or to leave the question open. While I think Canon 2 seems to show exactly what Canon 1 was meaning to define, there is always the possibility that the Council intended to define more than an answer to Joachim should have entailed.

And again, my reading of Canon 2 comes from the standpoint of someone ignorant of the complexities of Trinitarian theology. I guess that means I have a lot of reading to do. However, at the current moment, I don’t think “absolutely simple” had a controversial meaning. At the moment, it seems like the traditional understanding of three persons with one, consubstantial nature was being upheld. I think it seems plausible enough that Peter Kreeft was not mistaken when he cited Lateran IV’s definition of God as a profession of faith that expresses the standard Christian position on the Triune God.

Of course, I realize that I am naturally inclined to give the Catholic Church the benefit of the doubt. However, after milling over this issue for a while, looking at it from a few different angles, I think my explanation is at least on the right track.

Although the traditional usage of simple cannot be ignored in the Western Tradition, I also know from past experience that too many people try to read things into the statements of Popes and the Magisterium by means of implication. In my second comment, I brought up an instance where it seemed like Pope Leo XIII had condemned evolution. Pope Leo XIII was talking about marriage, but the language could be construed to mean a condemnation of evolution. Clearly, based on the last 50 years in the Catholic Tradition, the question of evolution is still an open one.

While the meaning of “absolutely simple” must be taken into account, I am of the school of thought that Papal statements must be read parsimoniously. I don’t think we should read in between the lines of what was being addressed and what was actually said. Going back to the evolution example, the Catholic Church was very wary of evolution in the 1870’s and the 1890’s. In fact, Vatican I was thinking about condemning evolution, but the Council was cut short. Leo XIII probably thought the same way as the bishops of Vatican I did. All of these things contribute to the argument that Leo XIII did condemn evolution in his 1890 encyclical “Arcanum”.

However, Leo XIII was clearly addressing issues about marriage, not about evolution. Even if some people want to read a condemnation of evolution into his words, no such condemnation was being made: the context makes that clear.

Getting back to Lateran IV: we can always make arguments that some things –such as the identity of God’s essence with His being– have been solemnly defined if we only read between the lines of what was actually said. However, Canon 2 seems to show that nothing about God’s essence, being, etc was being discussed (however, since I am only a first year philosophy student, I could very well be wrong). What was being defined was the Unity of the Trinity. Joachim preached a sort of tritheism. The Catholic Church countered by saying that the Father and the Son are consubstantial. However, this substance is indivisible: they truly share one nature, whole and entire. I think this is the parsimonious reading of the Canon, and I think it explains all of the facts. “Absolutely simple’s” usage in Canon 2 seems to lend itself to such an interpretation, since the Canon directly links indivisibility in this context to “absolutely simple”. From my very limited perspective, it seems like nothing extra was being posited.

As you can see, while I don’t think the traditional usage of “absolutely simple” can or should be ignored, I think that the Canons provide enough evidence to show what they were intending to condemn and what they were intending to declare…

I’ll complete my conclusion later. My new cousin just came to visit. ^^

Part of the problem is vocabulary. It seems to me that the same term is being employed in two different ways between the traditions. For the West “absolutely simple” picks out an identity relation. In the East it picks out the idea of complete or full presence.

Jack’s pantheistic gloss is not Maximus’ idea since Maximus makes a clear *metaphysical* distinction between nature and grace. The only way on Jack’s reading to differentiate us from God is by sin. If that is the case then freedom has to be understood in terms of always choosing between good and evil. In which case God’s creating the world will either not be a choice or will be a choice between good and evil. In either case creation will be necessary for God and we are right back to Origenism. Jack’s thinking on ths point strikes me as still Origenistic. The energies are metaphysically different than created objects.

I think what Daniel means by inherent virtue can be cashed out easily in Aristotle’s notion of virtue as a natural capacity. Every man by his natural participation in the logoi of humanity, the blueprint or “form” is naturally capable of becoming virtuous. This does not mean that everyone is already virtuous.

What constitutes the union between the Word and His humanity according to the Nestorians? It was the will. The virtues are not in us by an act of will, but naturally. This is where you see Maximus has a tight connection between Christology and anthropology. If grace is instroduced to us outside of our nature, that is Nestorian according to Maximus, because it would mean that an attribute needs to be communicated to our nature for us to participate in the divine life. Monophysitism and Nestorianism go hand-in-hand in my opinion. They just differ on the mode of the union in Christ. A good place to start looking at the differences between these various positions is in Meyendorff’s Christ in Eastern Christian Thought.

Daniel