the natural law of death

In the beginning thoughts of St. Athanasius’ The Incarnation of the Word of God, he well establishes that it was God the Father by whom all things were created and all things are sustained. He then goes on to reflect upon the nature of man in and of himself (that is, considered apart from God), and he calls this nature something peculiar, by the standards of anglophone natural theologies anyway:

…But since the will of man could turn either way, God secured this grace that He has given by making it conditional from the first upon two things - namely, law and a place. He set them in His own paradise, and laid upon them a single prohibition. If they guarded the grace and retained the loveliness of their original innocence, then the life of paradise should be theirs, without sorrow, pain or care, and after it the assurance of immortality in heaven. But if they went astray and became vile, throwing away the birthright of beauty, then they would come under the natural law of death, and live no longer in paradise, but, dying outside of it, continue in death and in corruption.

…For God had made man thus (that is, as an embodied spirit), and had willed that he should remain in incorruption. But men, having turned from the contemplation of God to evil of their own devising, had come inevitably under the law of death. Instead of remaining in the state in which God had created them, they were in the process of becoming corrupted entirely, and death had them completely under its dominion. For the transgression of the commandment was making them turn back again according to their nature; and as they had come into being out of non-existence, so were they now on the way to returning, through corruption, to non-existence again. The presence and love of the Word had called them into being; inevitably, therefore, when they lost the knowledge of God, they lost existence with it; for it is God alone who exists, evil is non-being, the negation and antithesis of good. By nature, of course, man is mortal, since he was made from nothing; but he also bears the likeness of Him Who is, and if he preserves that likeness through constant contemplation, then his nature is deprived of its power and he remains incorrupt.

…This, then, was the plight of men. God had not only made them out of nothing, but had also graciously bestowed on them His own life by the grace of the Word. Then, turning from eternal things to things corruptible, by counsel of the devil, they had become the cause of their own corruption in death; for, as I said before, though they were by nature subject to corruption, the grace of their union with the Word made them capable of escaping the natural law, provided that they retained the beauty of innocence with which they were created. That is to say, the presence of the Word with them shielded them even from natural corruption….

Windows 95 = Mac 86

I remember a long time ago seeing a bumper sticker that said something like the above title. Now I confess I am Windows user, primarily since it was the “tradition” that I received. But I recognize that in many ways Macs are better systems. With that I don’t mean to enter into that fracas that is the ongoing war between these two groups. But the bumper stick made an important point. MS users wanted to think of their way as being better until Windows essentially popularized the same general idea. Then the Mac idea was the cat’s meow.

Psychologically it is interesting to me that in theology and philosophy this kind of thing happens quite often, especially if you are Orthodox. Make a criticism of Augustine, and you are labeled a pariah, an ignoramous and your mother was a hampster. But if you’re Catholic, well then, things are much different! This seems to be the case over at Kimel’s blog at his most recent post.

Piking Peter

Here’s a response to Peter Pike over at Triablogue about Libertarian Free Will.

Peter, 

Per the missed point, too many restrictions would be positing conditions inconsistent with the idea. So far I can’t see how any of the restrictions you posited preclude LFW. I think van Inwagen in his classic essay spelled out quite clearly what those inconsistent conditions are. 

Given that the power to do otherwise is glossed counter-factually, I don’t see how this makes it illusory.  I think a romp through counter factuals would help you here. If you disagree, do you think the fact that God created the world renders it necessary that God created the world? Could God have done otherwise or does that language mean nothing at all? If not, what’s the difference between your conception of deity and that of the Platonists with a necessary world? Doing your devotionals out of Plotinus, are we?

Be Thankful

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St Gregory Palamas on Eunomios and more

I am sure that this must have been posted before but as a refresher in the context of recent posts it may be helpful.

In refuting Eunomios, who claimed that the essence of God is revealed by created things, St Basil the Great writes that ‘created things manifest wisdom, art and power but not essence’. Thus the divine energy made manifest by created things is both uncreated and yet not God’s essence; and those who like Barlaam and Akindynos say that there is no difference between the divine essence and the divine energy are clearly Eunomians.

St Gregory Palamas Chapter 83: “Topics of Natural and Theological Science” in The Philokalia Vol 4. A few more quotes from the same source relating the distinction of essence and energies to will:

If the divine essence does not in any respect differ from the divine energy, then the act of generation and of procession will in no respect differ from the act of creating[,]… then neither does it differ from the divine will. Thus the Son who is begotten from the Father’s essence, is according to these people also created from the Father’s will[,]… and if the holy fathers testify that God has many energies - for… He has creative providences and goodnesses - then God also has many essences. This is a view that no member of the Christian race has ever uttered or entertained.

;

If the energies of God do not in any respect differ from the divine essence, then neither will they differ from one another. Therefore, God’s will is in no way different from His foreknowledge, and consequently either God does not foreknow all things - because He does not will all that occurs - or else He wills evil also, since He foreknows all. This means either that He does not foreknow all things which is the same as saying that He is not God, or that He is not good, which is also the same as saying He is not God. Thus God’s foreknowledge does differ from His will, and so both differ from the divine essence.

;and

If the divine energies do not differ form one another, then God’s creative power is not distinct from His foreknowledge. But in that case, since God began to create at a particular moment, He also began to foreknow at a particular moment. Yet if God did not have foreknowledge of all things before the ages how could He be God? If God’s creative energy does not differ in any respect from divine foreknowledge, then created things are concurrent with God’s foreknowledge. Thus because God unoriginately has foreknowledge and what is foreknown is unoriginately foreknown, it follows that God creates unoriginiately, and therefore that created things will have been created unoriginately. But how shall He be God if His creatures are in no way subsequent to Him? If God’s creative energy in no respect differs from His foreknowledge, then the act of creating is not subject to His will, since His foreknowledge is not so subject. In that case God will create, not by an act of volition, but simply because it is His nature to create. But how will he be God if He creates without volition?

As St Gregory demonstrates, one gets into many difficulties holding absolute divine simplicity without distinguishing between essence and energies, or by trying to force the God of Revelation into pagan theistic models and categories, which I believe are insufficient to deal with the Trinity, the Incarnation and creation beginning by God’s volition at a particular moment from non-existence. It follows, in line with St Gregory, that only with the essence/energy distinction can one hope to be speaking of the Biblical God. Also, although not to be taken too far, we can see from our understanding of created energy that the uncreated divine energies tell against a static God but rather tell of a dynamic God. Of course God transcends human/created experience of dynamism and He is not subject to changing His mind nor to passions. These things in Scripture are not pointing to who God is but to our synergy in salvation. It tells of our freedom of will because God is unchanging in willing all men to be saved but yet few are chosen. Our choices bring different consequences, which can be described in human terms of God relenting or getting angry, but one should not ascribe these to God in a human way of changing His mind or becoming passionate.

Here’s a Dot

“According to Rowan Williams, the central concern is with the freedom of God’s will. Arius insists that God is self-subsistent, and because he is immaterial he is “without any kind of plurality or composition.” If the Son is eternally with God, then there is something beside God that qualifies or limits Him, and God is unlimited. To be in relation is to be limited and qualified, and God is absolute. As Williams says, “if God is free in respect of every contingent, mutable and passible reality, the Word exists because God chooses that he should.” For Williams, Arius’s theology is very “conservative,” affirming what earlier writers would have affirmed: “God is free, the world need not exist, the Word is other than God, the Word is part of the world, so the Word is freely formed ex nihilo.” If the Father “necessarily” begets the Son, then His freedom is qualified and limited by some necessity. In addition, as Letham points out, Arians “wanted to protect God from involvement in creation, from human experiences and sufferings. Jesus’ human limitations showed that he was inferior to God.”

Now, in philosophical theology, who does Arius’ God sound like? Absolutely simple unlimited being to which all relations are extrinsic…hmmm.

“From this, we can see that the assumptions behind Arianism are precisely Hellenistic assumptions. To be absolute means to be entirely unrelated. And to be absolute means to be free from contaminations and involvement with the material creation. Harnack had it exactly backward. It wasn’t the orthodox who were Hellenizing the faith; the Arians were the one who were incapable of bursting out of the confines of Greek metaphysics. (See also Zizioulas on how Trinitarian theology burst the categories of Hellenistic thought.)”

Duh. This is what the Orthodox with their “subbiblical” Trinitarianism have been saying all along. Now, does your theology “burst” the categories of Hellenism or think that they are necessary to doing theology proper? Compare and see. Just go read Hodge, Warfield, Turretin, Bavink…err I mean Melancthon, Chemnitz, Walther…err I mean Aquinas, Scotus, Albert…err I mean Augustine…err I mean Plotinus, Proclus…Plato.

Calvin’s Daddy

“Ockham holds that in most cases God and creatures act together as ‘partial causes.’  God does not will to produce most effects alone, but acts as a partial cause together with a created secondary cause, such that the partial causality exercised by the secondary cause is not superfluous.  Here, however, God suspends the causal power of the secondary causes (that is, the beatified will) and acts as the total efficient cause of the will’s enjoyment.  The beatific act then will not be a free but a necessary act.”

Simon Francis Gaine O.P., Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? T & T Clark, 78-79

Which Alternative is Evil?

“For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again; this charge I have received from my Father.”

 John 10:17-18

Book Deals

Here are some book deals on contemporary analytic literature on free will and determinism. While I do not agree with all of the authors, these works comprise a good dose of the literature being discussed.

 Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

James Tomberlin, Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom

Laura Waddell Ekstrom, Agency and Responsibility

Derek Pereboom, Living Without Free Will

Harry Frankfurt The Importance of What We Care About

Joseph Cambell ed., Freedom and Determinism

I will have mercy on whomever I will have mercy

Verse 20, 21. “Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, Why hast Thou made me thus? Hath not the potter (Read Jeremiah 18:1-10) power, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?”

Here it is not to do away with free-will that he says this, but to show, up to what point we ought to obey God. For in respect of calling God to account, we ought to be as little disposed to it as the clay is. For we ought to abstain not from gainsaying or questioning only, but even from speaking or thinking of it at all, and to become like that lifeless matter, which followeth the potter’s hands, and lets itself be drawn about anywhere he may please. And this is the only point he applied the illustration to, not, that is, to any enunciation of the rule of life, but to the complete obedience and silence enforced upon us. And this we ought to observe in all cases, that we are not to take the illustrations quite entire, but after selecting the good of them, and that for which they were introduced, to let the rest alone. As, for instance, when he says, “He couched, he lay down as a lion;” (Numbers 24:9) let us take out the indomitable and fearful part, not the brutality, nor any other of the things belonging to a lion. And again,
when He says, “I will meet them as a bereaved bear” (Hosea 13:8), let us take the vindictiveness. And when he says, “our God is a consuming fire” (Deuteronomy 4:24; and Hebrews 12:29), the wasting power exerted in punishing. So also here must we single out the clay, the potter, and the vessels. And when he does go on to say, “Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?” do not suppose that this is said by Paul as an account of the creation, nor as implying a necessity over the will, but to illustrate the sovereignty and difference of dispensations; for if we do not take it in this way, divers incongruities will follow for if here he were speaking about the will, and those who are good and those not so, He will be Himself the Maker of these, and man will be free from all responsibility. And at this rate, Paul will also be shown to be at variance with himself, as he always bestows chief honor upon free choice. There is nothing else then which he here wishes to do, save to persuade the hearer to yield entirely to God, and at no time to call Him to account for anything whatever. For as the potter (he says) of the same lump makes what he pleaseth, and no one forbids it; thus also when God, of the same race of men, punisheth some, and honoreth others, be not thou curious nor meddlesome herein, but worship only, and imitate the clay. And as it followeth the hands of the potter, so do thou also the mind of Him that so ordereth things. For He worketh nothing at random, or mere hazard, though thou be ignorant of the secret of His Wisdom. Yet thou allowest the other of the same lump to make divers things, and findest no fault: but of Him you demand an account of His punishments and honors, and will not allow Him to know who is worthy and who is not so; but since the same lump is of the same substance, you assert that there are the same dispositions. And, how monstrous this is! And yet not even is it on the potter that the honor and the dishonor of the things made of the lump depends, but upon the use made by those that handle them, so here also it depends on the free choice. Still, as I said before, one must take this illustration to have one bearing only, which is that one should not contravene God, but yield to His incomprehensible Wisdom. For the examples ought to be greater than the subject, and than the things on account of which they are brought forward, so as to draw on the hearer better. Since if they were not greater and did not mount far above it, he could not attack as he ought, and shame the objectors. However, their ill-timed obstinacy he silenced in this way with becoming superiority. And then he introduces his answer. Now what is the answer?