Eternal Love, Eternal Freedom

Here is a reply I have written to Paul Manata of Triablogue fame conerning free will and moral impeccability. Some of you might find the original exchange linked above helpful to get a sense of the conversation.

Paul,

 Please excuse the tardiness of my reply to you. With end of the semester duties and fighting off pneumonia now for the last two weeks I have had to put all things internet related to one side.

 I agree that Hasker believes a lot of other things, many of them I do not. Let me be clear, I have zero sympathy with his Open Theism. You are right to write that you are entitled to bring out implications, but the questions I had were concerning how you got those implications from the text cited. I took Hasker to be arguing that a necessary condition for genuine love was a lack of sufficient antecedent conditions, which is why he is focusing on sourcehood. We can look at the person affected by the potion or the person given the potion but I think the result will be the same. That is just to say that Hasker’s example is intuitive purchase. In imaginative cases I think it would be right to think that without the potion the person giving it would be fearful of losing the “love” that he had. Why? Because the potion was the source and without it, there wouldn’t be love present. This shows I think what Hasker wants it to show, namely that sourcehood is a necessary condition on freedom. This leaves untouched I think your concern. Hasker isn’t attacking the claim that an unfailable love is genuine love, but rather that a love brought about by sufficient antecedent conditions isn’t a genuine love. One can have the first without the second and Hasker has written as much elsewhere. And Hasker is not alone in thinking that one can have an unfailable outcome without determinism. If you don’t think so, then Frankfurt cases go out the window since they would then, as Widerker, Kane and Co. have argued, presuppose determinism.

I don’t know the inner workings of Hasker’s mind on Trinitarianism, but on a traditional model, the Father, Son and Spirit don’t have different wills, but only one so I don’t know how it would be possible for the Son to will for the Father to give up his nature. Your model presupposes a heterodox view of the will as hypostatic that I don’t think that even Hasker to my knowledge endorses.

My comments about time weren’t pedantic. What they point out is that the example as you frame it is ill framed. And lots of people believe that God is timeless, but that doesn’t tell me much since there are a variety of theories on divine timelessness. Furthermore, the point was to drive the question about the coherence of libertarianism further into the doctrine of God, which is where you took it, rather than looking at it within a temporal box.

I am not sure what problem you see concerning Libertarians wanting to say that the future is open to God. I suppose some of that turns on what constitutes openness. I do not have in mind what Hasker has in mind or Boyd or Pinnock for that matter. I suppose you are thinking that if for libertarians the future isn’t set then it isn’t set even for God and hence libertarians are committed to some form of Open Theism. For myself I think some things in the future are set irrespective of human choices and some are not. Those that are not are set by human choices, about which God knows infallibly and from which he can redirect those intentions to his intentional end (Gen 50:20) To the point, I don’t think God has a future or even a present. All that Libertarianism requires of me is that God’s actions meet the conditions on freedom. If God’s actions do, then free will can’t be essentially defined in terms of temporal conditions: God’s creation of the world is a perfect example where there are no possible temporal conditions, even more so on my more “radical” view of complete timelessness.

If I missed your comments on your thought that not all of God’s actions were determined by his nature, then I apologize. In any case, I think your thinking so makes more problems for you than you think it solves. If God is simple, then God and his actions are the same. This comports well with the idea that the divine nature determines divine actions, but it doesn’t comport well with the idea that some divine actions are not. That will directly imply that God is composite.

You are correct that your argument only needs to give one case where an action is determined and still praiseworthy but I don’t think you have given it since I don’t see any good reason to think that the unfailability of the Father loving the Son is an instance of a deterministic relationship and you haven’t given me any. The only reason proffered is if we don’t think of it as necessary (what kind of necessity you have in mind here is not known to me), this will make the relationship contingent. But this is only so if these categories are applicable to God. I don’t think they are.
The counter arguments I gave were not assumptions about the Trinity, they were arguments. First, your arguments turn on controversial assumptions, platonic ones at that. Second, if we grant those assumptions we end up exploding the Trinity. If the divine essence determines the actions of the persons in the case of generation, then it will produce an infinity of persons. And I don’t see how you can appeal to the idea that these actions are not determined by the divine essence since they are just a fundamental as the idea that the Father loves the Son. The counter argument undermines your argument in the following way. You argue that if we take such and so view we end up rejecting the Trinity, so we have to take the relationship as determined. I have only given you the same argument. If we take the relationship as determined then we end up rejecting the Trinity, so we can’t take it as determined either.

As I wrote previously, the Father loves the Son with libertarian freedom, but libertarian freedom doesn’t imply the contingency of any and all acts done by it. This is what you are assuming. Even Libertarians with whom I disagree maintain a distinction between derivative and underivative freedom, where one can choose to later give up alternatives, but the choice at a later point is still done with libertarian freedom. We can strip away the temporal language here and assume for the sake of argument a simultaneity view and speak of antecedent and consequent willing in God. God could do such and so, but given certain other conditions which God has enjoined, he could not do such and so. This is a fairly standard apparatus among the Reformed Scholstics.

When you write that God’s freedom is neither libertarian nor compatibilistic, I can’t see that you have any coherent idea on offer. You write that God is not constrained or forced by anything, but everyone says as much. Furthermore, to speak of God as determined by his essence certainly seems to deprive him of some measure of control. And the appeal to mystery here is strikes me as rather ad hoc. And incomprehensibility may help but only at the cost of helping libertarians for they too could easily invoke it against your criticisms since our freedom is essentially divine freedom since we are made in his image. So if you don’t have to provide some account, then I can’t see why the Libertarians need to. Further, why is it that Calvinists get all bothered and claim instant victory when non-Calvinists appeal to mystery (“See! They can’t answer it, which shows that they are wrong!”) but when cornered that “M” word just falls off their lips like an April shower? I don’t mean to be rude, but this seems ad hoc.

Theopedia is hardly a good source for working through the positions of professional philosophers. Generally reading their books and articles are. I have read Kane, talked to Kane, eaten with Kane. I think if you spent some time in his works you’d see that he’s not as easy to dismiss as you think.

As for the posts on heavenly freedom, I do think that some libertarians misunderstand certain features of the concept. But lots of libertarians think that about other libertarians. The same goes for Compatibilists. It is not like Fischer and Ravizza agree with Frankfurt’s hierarchical account. I acted and argued that your arguments against specific points were bad ones, because I thought they were and that a more charitable read could have been given. I don’t see why I am not entitled to argue so.

Tis true that almost every single version of the FWD defense is constructed such that it implies that FW implies the ability to do evil. And in some sense I agree. The problem is that there is an ambiguity there that has to be dissolved. Is the ability to sin essential to freedom or to something else? I think something else and it is that something else combined with freedom that makes evil possible on earth for a period of time and development, but the lack of it, that makes it not possible in heaven or with God.

The question is not whether your claim works against lots of other positions. Your target was Libertarianism per se, which means you have to cover all of the conceptual ground, not some, just as say the deductive problem of evil has to work against all Christian conceptions of God, not just most.

When you write something on the AP condition, please drop me a line and let me know.

I don’t know that Hasker wouldn’t agree. In fact, I think he might and it might lead to his rejecting of Open Theism for something better. In fact he writes, when he writes, on heavenly freedom, to get close(er) to my view, though he hasn’t figured it out yet. And the question isn’t whether Hasker would agree, but whether my view is in fact right and I can show the compatibility of moral impeccability and LFW.

Granted that I did not show that indeterminism was compatible with moral impeccability, but in my defense, that is a separate problem and is treated as such in the literature. Second, I can hardly be charged with not solving everything at once. The MIND argument aside, my work goes a long way to answering Mackie’s criticism of the FWD and that is worthwhile in and of itself since no one has been able to do it for forty years. Third, given that heavenly existence isn’t necessarily temporal, let alone governed by say Quantum Physics, to take about the same antecedent history seems, shall we say, problematic. There are more problems there than just free will. Fourth, the MIND argument has a life of its own and most people I know in the literature think, while the Luck problem and the Chance problem are significant issues to be discussed the MIND argument is pretty much done.

It doesn’t matter if your reading of the Bible doesn’t square with my reading of the Bible or my assumptions since the matter was whether moral impeccability was compatible with LFW. If you think on my own principles I am mistaken, please point out where.

I am united with all Libertarians on many core issues just as you are united with many Calvinists on many core issues. Does that mean you peddle here your own minority views and aren’t entitled to do so? Isn’t the question are such views true, rather than, are such views a minority position?

As for risk taking, I find it funny that you and Hasker actually agree. You and Hasker agree that free will and divinity are incompatible so it must be one or the other. You just disagree on which horn of the dilemma you take. This shows I think that you actually share the same fundamental worldview. On the other hand, I disagree with both turns because I disagree with the fundamental assumption.

Furthermore, you argued not just against Hasker, but from Hasker’s comment against Libertarianism per se. Citing goofy stuff Hasker says that he thinks is implied by Libertarianism is no proof that it is so. Nor is it adequat eto run back behind views specific to Hasker when the target was Libertarianism, and not all Libertarians agree with Hasker’s theological views.

 In fairness to Hasker, he doesn’t think the Trinity has LFW. Just look what he says. http://www.opentheism.info/pages/questions/phiq/freewill/freewill_03.php

And

http://www.opentheism.info/pages/questions/phiq/freewill/freewill_01.php

Now it is obvious that Hasker has goofed here but not in the way that you think. Hasker has actually come full circle right back to the conception of God he and others like Pinnock have been arguing against. If God is determined and free, why can’t we be? Most Open Theists I know run like the plague from this question. In any case, what this shows is that the view you defend and the view that Hasker defends share the same fundamental assumptions and at bottom are really two sides of the same coin. This shows that this perennial debate in western Christianity is seriously lost.

On the risk view you are correct that frustration is a necessary consequence, but not for LFW, as I argued above since what makes frustration possible is only a temporary state that can be transcended.

 

10 Responses to Eternal Love, Eternal Freedom

  1. Gina says:

    Thomas,
    Thanks very much.

  2. Perry,

    I am having trouble connecting the dots between being and time. I think you have said in the past that being is a verb, or an action, and so that would distinguish it from essence and also make it an attribute? Self-subsistence… that would also be an action? So actions occur in time or are eternally done which distinguishes them from substance. But how do you get from there to eternity is not a thing – it’s an action? or a way to chronicle such actions and categorize them from ones that happen once, or are ever occurring. But if God’s energies are eternal… Back to essence is not a being. Essence comes after person, so you are not necessarily saying that God is not a being, but that His essence isn’t, but you are saying that God is not a thing, but a being, if He is one, which I actually don’t think you would say He is because being is a verb. I suppose “thing” and “being” are too associated with createdness, which God is not, but He’s not nothing either so that is why we use apophatism to describe what He isn’t rather than what He is, so that helps me with “being”, but not time.

    Time itself is created. Bishop Ware says that it is a merciful space between us and God, so that we are not destroyed before we attain His likeness. So perhaps you are saying that eternity pertains to God’s uncreated essence and is free of the constraints of time and createdness, but there is not an opposition between createdness and God, so perhaps time and createdness are incarnated with uncreated means/mercy and grace, until (temporal word) we become uncreated, which concept I don’t comprehend either. ADS sounds like becoming uncreated means that we lose our created bodies and such, which implies sort of an Origenistic notion that our souls had no created beginning, and ideally become absorbed in the Divine Consciousness. But I don’t really see an alternative to becoming uncreated than that, if that is indeed what Saints become in the Eschaton. Somehow the key is in Christ’s Body, if it became uncreated at His resurrection but somehow retained it’s physicality, which I thought was a created thing, then that is how ours will be.

  3. Andrea,

    I think you are on the right track with respect to the order of theology. As for dialectic and timelessness, I do not think that I introduce a dialectic between eternity and temporality. Here is why. Since I don’t think the divine essence is self subsisting being, I do not think that eternity constitutes something. I also do not think that it constitutes nothing either. So God is not some thing, but he is also not no-thing either. Since this is the case, there can’t be an opposition between eternity and temporality.

  4. Paul,

    I think it is fair to hamstring you with the citation in question. The implicit claim was that these problems for libertarianism could be gotten from that text. My comments are hence not a stretch since the idea I mentioned is right there in the text you cited.
    This is the way things seem to me. Either your criticisms are of libertarianism per se or of Hasker in particular. If the former, then other citations from Hasker which do not pick out ideas essential to libertarianism won’t help you. On the other hand, if your criticisms are of Hasker’s take, then you are free to pull in other citations from his work. This is why I argued that Hasker was in fact wrong.

    I generalized because I was discussing libertarianism in general. The use of the “love potions” by Hasker is simply an illustrative device to pump your intuitions about libertarianism, and specifically the idea of sourcehood.

    Hasker is using the example to motivate thinking about alternative possibilities, which are implied by sourcehood. This is why I think he is in fact thinking about ruling out sufficient antecedent conditions. This is why he writes in the citation you gave that the person “wants to be loved for his own sake and not because of the potion.” Consequently, I think you misread Hasker. If the person doesn’t wish to be loved because of the potion, then he wishes to be loved for his own sake, which refers to the agent as a source and as a terminus. To be loved for one’s own sake is to say that the agent has intrinsic value and is an end, a telos, which rules out any sufficient antecedent conditions for their actions.

    I know what Kane holds regarding moral impeccability and free will and on that point I think he is wrong. What I believe I was referring to was your criticisms about libertarianism in general that I think he could get away from quite easily if one gave a more charitable gloss.

    As for moral impeccability, his view isn’t actually compatible with determinism. It is compatible with derivtatively free actions, for which there may not be alternative possibilities. Even though an agent chooses to fix their character and later cannot do otherwise, they are still libertarianily free even though they could not do otherwise at a later date due to the fixed character. Why? Because when they choose that character they did have AP’s. This view is not compatible with determinism so I think you are mistaken there. For my part, I don’t think the problem with thinking about divine freedom is the idea of a greatest good, but the idea that such a good is metaphysically simple. That I think would preclude libertarian freedom for morally impeccable agents. In any case, Kane isn’t a compatibilist about heavenly freedom. I think you have just misread him. His view is similar to Sennett’s.

    I do think an intermediate state is required for say infants if one is to be consistently libertarian. But of course, I am Orthodox and that isn’t a problem for me since we have different books in our canon than you do. The more bells and whistles will only render the account less plausible if other accounts can do the same explanatory heavy lifting without creating worse problems. I don’t think Compatibilism can. It does a lousy job of explaining divine freedom in reference in creation or redemption, renders the fall inexplicable and impugns God’s goodness by leaving one totally bereft of any plausible answer to the problem of evil. So I’ll take an intermediate state over not being able to explain why God predestined Adam who was “free” to sin when God could have brought about the same end, his glorification, without any sin whatsoever.
    The “something else” was the notion of virtue. I think that most libertarians in philosophical theology put far too much weight on freedom to outweigh the possibility of evil. The idea in short is this. In the face of suffering, many people will claim that they would be willing to give up their freedom in exchange for a world without evil. But I do not think they are willing to give up their freedom and moral value altogether in exchange for a world without evil. Consequently Plantinga type FWD’s are inadequate. The real work being done is the notion of moral value, which free will is a necessary condition.

    The problems that the Mind Argument picks out are a separate problem from how to reconcile freedom with moral impeccability, which is why it is treated separately in the literature. I agree how to reconcile free will with indeterminism is part of the debate, but so are lots of things. It is also part of the debate of how to show that compatibilist conditions on freedom exclude manipulation but of course you didn’t give any solution to that problem. Why? Because I think you recognize that you were focusing on one problem. So the question is, the Mind Argument aside, did I present a way to reconciling moral impeccability and libertarian freedom. Yes, I did. If you don’t think so, you need to do more than just point out other conceptual matters but show exactly where my account goes afoul. My short blog post deals with pretty much the standard matters in the professional literature on moral impeccability and free will and in fact fare more than usual.

    I agree that moral impeccability would be incompatible with LFW if LFW entailed the ability to do something morally bad. But this is an assumption you are making. You are also assuming that the good is simple and so you seem to think that doing otherwise means doing otherwise than the good. But I think the good is plural and not simple, so doing otherwise means doing another good for morally impeccable agents. I don’t see any good reason for thinking that the denizens of heaven are in or could be in such a situation where there is only one good to choose. If one is a Platonist about the doctrine of God and sees God as the form of the Good as Augustine did for example then sure, that will be a problem, but I am not a Platonist. This was in part my point, namely that what is motivating your thinking in this matter is nascent Platonism in your Reformed understanding of God.

    It is not acceptable for you to point out goofy stuff from Hasker elsewhere when you are attacking libertarianism per se. Its fine when you are attacking ideas limited to Hasker or Open Theism for example. But lots of libertarians would not agree with the other stuff Hasker writes and so you can’t make an objection to libertarianism stick from material limited to Hasker or Open Theists like him.

    Secondly, I don’t think that it is a “wasteland” with respect to libertarianism. It isn’t any more so than say with Compatibilism. There certainly is an idea of LFW just like there is an idea of compatibilist freedom. If there is no “libertarian position” then what you are attacking is not libertarianism, but just ideas limited to Hasker. It doesn’t seem to me that you can have it both ways.

    I may make some mistakes but it would be helpful if you did not impute to me the worst possible motives. I try not to do so with you, even though we have significant disagreements. It only makes for a poor dialog. What I did do I think was present a dilemma, which I more clearly spelled out above. Either you are attacking libertarianism per se, or Hasker’s specific take on it. You seem to move back and forth between these two tasks and I don’t think you can consistently do both. It doesn’t matter if I am in the majority or minority on some issues. What matters is if I am right. Hasker’s ideas on some points are not in the majority or the consensus concerning what constitutes LFW. He may be right on them, but I think he is wrong. But what one can’t do is simply attack them and presume that one has annihilated libertarianism because one has shown that some controversial ideas are mistaken.

    Suppose frustration is entailed by Hasker’s view. That would be a problem for Hasker, but the question is, can one come up with an account of LFW that doesn’t? I think it can be done and I think I did it, at least in large measure. In which case, Hasker is mistaken about what constitutes LFW. The questions I had were how you got those implications about LFW from that one text where Hasker was talking about ideas that were fairly widespread in Libertarianism

    I hope this helps clarify my thoughts.

  5. trvalentine says:

    Gina, I have comments on the ‘clarification’ cited on the web page you provided:
    http://www.geocities.com/trvalentine/orthodox/vatican_clarification.html

    More comments are available from
    http://www.geocities.com/trvalentine/orthodox/filioquemain.html

    Thomas

  6. Krause says:

    Greetings from St. Petersberg Perry! (I’m on a sweet school trip which I’m using as a really awsome spiritual pilgrimage) I hope your semester ended alright and that you’re feeling better. I’ve been praying for you and your whole situation.

    Anyways, I was wondering if you could explain this in a little more detail to me:

    “Second, if we grant those assumptions we end up exploding the Trinity. If the divine essence determines the actions of the persons in the case of generation, then it will produce an infinity of persons.”

    I think I get it and it might be so obvious that I’m stupid for asking, but I was wondering if you could sort of show your work a little bit and amake explicit the implicit propositions.

    Good to see you posting. God bless.

  7. Gina says:

    Sorry, I know this is off-topic but I wonder if anyone could comment on the following. If you prefer to email, my hotmail address is alleghenies32.

    http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Atrium/8410/filioque.html

  8. Perry,

    I read the Triablogue OP and the first few comments before you all started talking about modern philosopher’s (so I hope I’m not wrong that the following wasn’t brought up), but what occurred to me was that Paul was putting Actions/Activities first, then Essence, then Person. Not loving is a sin, God cannot commit sin because of His perfect divine essence, therefore He as a Person does not have the choice to not love the Son, for ex. But in the Orthodox Ordo Theologiae, Person comes first, then Activities, then Essence. So God, as a Divine Person, freely chooses to eternally love the Son and that establishes the fact that God is Love.

    Which leads to another issue you brought up here about timelessness. It seems to me that you may have introduced a dialectical relationship between eternity and temporality. I am wondering if eternity actually exists within the temporal in a transcendent way where the impure is simultaneously “burned away” as it were. This isn’t the same as the Protestant notion of God covering our sins with a magic blanket of snow (the robe of Christ) where He can’t see it, but maybe through His timeless foreknowledge where sin is repented from in time, or through the effective accomplishments of Christ the sin has already always being defeated, if we would realize it. This is perhaps how He can always receive us back when we turn to Him. It’s our perception of our sins that keeps the distance on our side. I’m not addressing the state of people who may never repent, or what happens to us if we don’t repent of everything because I’m not sure what will happen to us, but it is a serious enough issue for many Saints to struggle to their very last breath.

    On second search of the times you say “temporal”, maybe I have read the dialectic into your statements. If we see things in a “temporal box”. Transcendence is seeing beyond the box. I was taking temporal to mean “in time”, but perhaps you mean in time and beyond.

    “Third, given that heavenly existence isn’t necessarily temporal, let alone governed by say Quantum Physics…”

    Will time and physics be destroyed? (seems dialectic opposition to me) Or given another dimension? Back to Person first, if quantum physics are actions, then heaven will not be governed by them, things may take on a different life of their own, and they may include “traditional” physics or not, it’s their choice.

  9. Paul M. says:

    p.s. Frustration is necessary for LFW on Hasker’s account which is what I was arguing, and you started off arguing. You are now backpeddaling and moving the discussion away from Hasker’s quote, which contradicts your stated constraints: “but the questions I had were concerning how you got those implications from the text cited.” And since it is irrational to hamstrng me to only one quote from someone, especially since his position is fairly well known, and I obviously cannot quote everything he has written, then when I pulled from his other statements, that he believes, my argument goes through straightway.

  10. Paul M. says:

    Hi Perry,

    As you indicated, this response came in late and I have since moved on to other projects. I will drop you a line when I do comment on those things you are interested.
    But I will offer a brief reply and clarification, and then bow out:

    I do not think it fair to hamstring me to sticking simply with Hasker’s quoted section. I used it as a springboard. If you claim that I must stick only with what Hasker stated in the quote, then this too renders some of your comments a stretch. For as you say,

    I took Hasker to be arguing that a necessary condition for genuine love was a lack of sufficient antecedent conditions, which is why he is focusing on sourcehood.

    But here you generalize and the Hasker quote specifically spoke of something specific, i.e., “love potions.”

    I, again, took Hasker to be arguing not necessarily against antecedent conditions, but against the ability to give or refrain from giving love. Apparently we disagree about this. But I think your point is proved false, thus Hasker,

    the one who has used the potion finds that he wants to be loved for his own sake and not because of the potion

    If “for the sake of the potion” is an “antecedent condition” that Hasker is claiming cannot be had for “genuine love,” then it seems to me that “for his own sake” should also be removed, since that functions exactly the same as “for the sake of the potion.” Rather, if Hasker was arguing the way you claim, then it would be more proper for him to say:

    the one who has used the potion finds that he wants to be loved because the love emanated from the person and not from the potion

    Regarding Kane, I appreciate the attempt at predictive prophecy, but I have spent time in his works and have corresponded with him by email as well. He holds that the freedom God has is something like Wolf’s Freedom of self-perfection (cf. Intro to Free Will) which is, of course, compatible with determinism. He holds that it might be possible for God to have libertarian freedom only if there is no greatest good for God to choose, hence allowing him to choose from a multitude of goods. But Kane told me that this was not of the moral and prudential kinds that are the focus his Intro. Rather it would be a practical freedom to choose between incommensurable goods. So, he allows that God may have a measure of libertarian freedom in his sense in addition to self-perfective freedom SP-F, but, SP-F is the main freedom God has and is that freedom that is the ideal measure of merit to which our libertarian freedom aspires. And, of course, Kane says that if there ever was a situation where there was a greatest good, there would be no libertarian freedom.

    So, basically, Kane allows a kind of compatibilist freedom that humans will achieve (say) in heaven. But, as he told me, SP-F self must be arrived at in part by the exercise of the final two freedoms listed in the final chapter of the intro, viz. (4) freedom of self-determination and (5) freedom of self-formation (cf. Intro, pp. 171-174). Unfortunately, this argument, in my opinion, is rendered a knock out blow by the (highly plausible) consideration that (at least) some (all?) infants who die in infancy go to heaven. They will thus have SP-F, but could not have acquired that through (4) and (5), unless, of course, Kane wants to allow for the ability of the people to sin in heaven until they face that “life altering choice” and thus “form their wills” and hence become “ultimately responsible for their actions.” Perhaps Kane could invoke some kind of purgatory here, I suppose. More the more bells and whistles the less plausible, and it is certainly not plausible to me given my theological outlook. This, for me, also undercuts your response to the FWD and the ability to do evil. Infants who die in infancy do not have “time to develop on earth.” And I’m not even sure I grant or understand your “something else.”

    I explain why I used theopedia, and your comment, without my explanation, seems to be a cheap shot.

    Indeterminism is not a “separate account” since, at least according to Kane, to be morally responsible one must have UR and SFW, and part of the essence of the debate is how you could have this if indeterminism is the case. it can be treated as such, but it does come into play, all the time. I do not think you have to solve everything “at once,” but surely I can tell you why I wasn’t persuaded by your argument. If I have a broader context from which to pull, then I am sure you can grant how someone might not be persuaded by a paper which didn’t deal with positions and arguments the reader would need to see dealt with in order to grant the argument.

    Moral impeccability is incompatible with LFW because the agent does not have the ability to refrain from doing the good, and especially in those cases where there are not multiple options that could be opted for, i.e., “loving.”

    It is acceptable for me to point out “goofy stuff” Hasker says, especially when you intimate that you want to know how I can pull from the Hasker quote how I draw the problems. I think my other Hasker quotes were sufficient to show that I was correct in my accusation, and you simply avoided this argument by shifting your original comment to dealing with “what all libertarians say.” First, you said above that I shouldn’t expect you to deal with every possible position, so why now self-except yourself from this?, second there is no “libertarian position.” It’s a wasteland out there.

    So on many fronts I find your response unsuccessful, misleading, and downright false. What you did was come in under the guise of a united front for libertarianism, when I undermined this sneaky approach, you claim that it doesn’t matter if you are in the minority on some issues, but you feign, at first, a majority front against my comment. Thus I find this post a face-saving attempt to squirm out of your original comment, which was proved false.

    Best,
    PM

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